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ARBITRATION CONTRACTS BETWEEN TRUSTEES AND 
THEIR INVESTMENT AGENTS:  A WARNING LABEL 




 This Article considers whether arbitration clauses in contracts between 
trustees and their investment managers are binding on the trust beneficiar-
ies.  Nowadays, it is default law that a trustee may delegate investment dis-
cretion to an investment manager (IM); provided the IM has been prudently 
selected by the trustee and the IM’s activities are prudently monitored on an 
ongoing basis by the trustee.  The core relationship is one of agency, the trus-
tee being the principal and the IM being the agent.  The two, as well, are in a 
contractual relationship incident to the agency.  The IM, however, also owes 
fiduciary duties that run directly to the trust beneficiaries, though the benefi-
ciaries are parties neither to the agency nor the contract.  These duties are 
imposed separately by equity.  Assume the beneficiaries bring an action di-
rectly against the IM for breaching one or more of his or her equitable duties 
to them.  Should the trust beneficiaries be bound at law by the arbitration 
clause in the contract between the trustee and the IM?  The Article concludes 
that they should not be; but if they are then the trustee could well have been 
in breach of his or her equitable duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries 
by having acquiesced to the clause’s insertion in the first place.  And as to 
the IM, he or she, under general equitable principles, may well have a fidu-
ciary duty to the beneficiaries to waive his or her rights at law to have the 
dispute arbitrated, at least to the extent that it is in the interests of the benefi-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this Article is the arbitration contract that is typically in-
cident to an investment - management agency agreement between a trustee 
and a non-party to the trust relationship,1 not the trust term that purports to 
mandate arbitration of internal disputes between the trustee and the trust ben-
eficiary.  The Article concludes that if the trust is both irrevocable and regu-
lated by the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) and/or the Uniform Prudent Investor 
Act (UPIA), under default law the trustee would be ill-advised to enter into 
such a contract, absent some very special facts.  This is because lurking in 
UTC § 807, which regulates delegation by trustees, is some stealth liability-
shifting language that calls into question whether such an arbitration contract 
would be enforceable at law as against the trust beneficiary, and if it would 
be, whether in equity the trustee would be breaching his fiduciary duty to the 
                                                     
1. See generally Mary F. Radford, Predispute Arbitration Agreements Between Trustees and 
Financial Institutions: Are Beneficiaries Bound?, 40 ACTEC L.J. 273, 278-83 (2014). 
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trust beneficiary by entering into the contract with the investment agent in 
the first place.  To further complicate matters, the trustee’s investment agent 
may be asking for trouble were he to decline to waive any legal rights he 
might have under the arbitration contract as against the trust beneficiary if 
requested to do so by the trust beneficiary.  Here is the UTC language this 
Article is referring to: 
 
(b) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the 
trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the 
delegation.  
(c) A trustee who complies with the… [prudent delegation provi-
sions of] . . . subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the 
trust for an action by the agent to whom the function was delegated.2 
 
The italicized language is repeated almost verbatim in the section of the 
UPIA that purports to regulate delegation of investment and managements 
functions by trustees that are subject to the Act’s provisions.3 
 To set the stage, a trustee of an irrevocable trust, as principal, enters into 
a discretionary investment-management agency relationship with a non-party 
to the trust relationship.  The agent is to perform a critical fiduciary duty that 
the trustee owes the trust beneficiary, namely the prudent management of the 
entrusted assets.4  Incident to the agency agreement is an arbitration contract 
to which the trust beneficiary is not a party.5  Assuming the trustee’s delega-
tion of investment discretion is prudent, under the UTC and the UPIA, pri-
mary fiduciary liability shifts from the trustee to his agent for any economic 
harm to the beneficiary’s equitable property rights that is occasioned by the 
negligent or otherwise wrongful actions of the agent.6  The trust beneficiary 
                                                     
2. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). This section provides that a trus-
tee may delegate duties and powers that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly dele-
gate under the circumstances. The trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in: (1) 
selecting an agent; (2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the pur-
poses and terms of the trust; and (3) periodically reviewing the agent’s action in order to monitor 
the agent’s performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation. Id.  
3. See UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 9(b) & (c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
4. It is said that “[t]wo grand principles underlie much of the Anglo-American law of trusts: 
the trustee’s duties of loyalty and of prudence.” JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION 
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 678 (5th ed. 2010). 
5. Radford, supra note 1, at 278-83. 
6. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“A trustee who complies with 
subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for an action of the agent to whom the 
function was delegated.”); see also UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 9(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) 
(“A trustee who complies with the requirements of subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries 
or to the trust for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the function was delegated.”). 
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is not a party to the agency agreement; the trust beneficiary is not a party to 
the arbitration contract (the trust beneficiary may yet to be conceived or as-
certainable); recourse against the prudent trustee has been foreclosed by the 
UPIA and the UTC; and still the trust beneficiary is bound at law by the terms 
of the arbitration contract?  In no way can it be said that the duties that the 
trustee’s investment agent owes the trust beneficiary are legal in nature.  
Those duties are equitable in that they are grounded in fiduciary principles of 
trust and agency as those principles have been tweaked by the UTC and the 
UPIA.7  They are not imposed at law by virtue of the terms of the arbitration 
contract.  As between the trustee’s investment agent and the trust beneficiary, 
equitable fiduciary duties run directly from the trustee’s investment agent to 
the trust beneficiary; the trust beneficiary owes the trustee’s investment agent 
(and the trustee for that matter) no reciprocal fiduciary duties.8  Nor does the 
trust beneficiary owe either contractual obligations of any sort. 9 
 The trust beneficiary is at a power disadvantage vis-à-vis the trustee and 
his agents in that critical information that a trust beneficiary would need in 
order to mount a successful defense of his equitable property rights under the 
trust and to which the trust beneficiary is entitled in equity is accessible to 
the trust beneficiary only if the trustee or his investment agent voluntarily 
divulges that information, or is compelled do so by the equity court.10  The 
reason that a trustee has such practical and exclusive control over the flow of 
                                                     
7. The trustee’s investment agent owes fiduciary duties to the trust beneficiaries under long-
standing general principles of equity, equitable principles that have merely been reinforced by the 
UTC and UPIA. See generally CHARLES E. ROUNDS JR. & CHARLES E. ROUNDS III, LORING AND 
ROUNDS: A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK, § 7.2.9 (2018 ed. 2017); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(b) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 9(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994).  These 
duties are not “legal in nature” as the trustee’s agent and the trust beneficiaries are neither in a 
contractual relationship, nor an agency relationship. See generally 4 SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS 
§ 2.3.10.3 (5th ed. 2017); see also WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 3 
(1964). 
8. See generally CHARLES E. ROUNDS JR. & CHARLES E. ROUNDS III, LORING AND ROUNDS: 
A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK, § 5.6 (2018 ed.). 
9. Id. 
10. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 2012) stat-
ing: 
The inherent subjectivity and impracticability of second guessing a trustee’s application 
of business judgment or exercise of fiduciary discretion are aggravated by the opportu-
nities and relative ease of concealing misconduct – or at least by the absence of timely 
information and the likely disappearance of relevant evidence – that results from the 
trustee’s day-to-day, usually long term, management of the trust property and control 
over trust records. 
 
             
2018] ARBITRATION CONTRACTS 267 
critical information pertaining to the trust relationship is that legal title to 
entrusted property is generally in the trustee, not the beneficiary.11 
II. THE INTERSECTION OF TRUST AND AGENCY LAW: A PRIMER 
A trust, which is a creature of equity, not legislation, is formally defined 
as:  
a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a man-
ifestation of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the 
person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the 
benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom 
is not the sole trustee.12   
 
 Absent legislation providing otherwise, a trust is not an entity, but a re-
lationship among multiple parties with respect to property, title to which is 
in the trustee.13  As to the world, the trustee is the owner of the subject prop-
erty.  It is the trustee who is liable at law for breaching the contract he enters 
into on behalf of the trust with non-parties to the trust relationship.14  This is 
what is meant by an external liability of the trustee.15  In equity, however, the 
trustee simultaneously assumes critical internal liabilities incident to the fi-
duciary duties he owes the trust beneficiaries and incident to the beneficiar-
ies’ equitable ownership of the subject property.16  The trustee’s internal du-
ties and liabilities vis-à-vis the trust beneficiaries arise from the trust 
relationship itself, not from principles of agency, contract, or tort.17  A trus-
tee, qua trustee, is neither an agent of nor in a contractual relationship with 
the trust beneficiaries.18 
Before proceeding, a word about this dual ownership of entrusted prop-
erty, whereby legal title to an item of property is in X while the equitable 
interest in the very same property and at the very same time is in Y.  To the 
layman and the civil lawyer, this splitting of interests is as mysterious as the 
                                                     
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). A trust is defined as a 
fiduciary relationship with respect to property that subjects the person who holds title to the subject 
property, namely the trustee, to equitable duties. Id.  
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
13. For an example of such legislation, see UNIF. STATUTORY TR. ENTITY ACT (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2013). 
14. See generally ROUNDS, JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at § 7.3.1. 
15. See generally id. at § 7.1. 
16. Id. 
17. See generally id. ch. 6 (The trustee’s equitable duties to the beneficiary incident to the trust 
relationship). The trustee, however, is not an agent of the beneficiary. Id. at § 5.6. 
18. See generally id. at §3.5.1. 
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Trinity.  How can it be that the trustee and beneficiaries both own the prop-
erty?  “Though the English do not lay exclusive claim to having discovered 
God, they do claim to have invented the trust with two natures in one.”19  In 
sorting out the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties and non-parties to 
the type of arbitration contract that is the subject of this Article, one needs to 
be mindful of the overlap of these two ownership regimes, the legal and the 
equitable.  
A. DELEGATION BY TRUSTEES OF INVESTMENT-MANAGEMENT 
DISCRETION: A PRE-UTC/UPIA LIABILITY PRIMER  
More likely than not, a trustee is vested with investment discretion, ei-
ther expressly or by implication.  This has been the trend since the Industrial 
Revolution.20  As late as 1939, at least on this side of the Atlantic, the invest-
ing of entrusted assets was a non-delegable function.21  Here is the first edi-
tion of Scott on Trusts, copyright 1939, on the subject:  
 
. . . [A] . . . trustee cannot properly employ an agent to select invest-
ments for the trust. If he entrusts trust funds to the agent for this 
purpose and through the dishonesty or negligence of the agent the 
funds are lost, the trustee is personally liable.22   
 
Thus it follows that were the trustee to enter into an investment manage-
ment agency agreement under which the agent was vested with investment 
discretion to make trades without the trustee’s advance approval, the very 
execution of the agreement would be a per se breach of trust.23  Moreover the 
agent himself would risk liability vis-à-vis the trust beneficiaries for know-
ingly participating in a breach of trust.24  It is self-evident that an arbitration 
clause in an unlawful contract would not be enforceable, and would certainly 
not be enforceable against someone not a party to the contract.  
                                                     
19. J.H. BEEKHUIS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, VOL. VI, 
ch. 2, ¶ 262 (Frederick H. Lawson et al. eds. 1975). 
20. ROUNDS, JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at § 6.2.2. 
21. Id. 
22. II AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 171.2, at 916 (1939). 
23. See generally 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 17102 (1939) (“On the other hand, a trustee cannot 
properly employ an agent to select investments for the trust.”). 
24. See generally ROUNDS, JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at §7.2.9 (liability of third parties 
who knowingly participate with the trustee in a breach of trust). 
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By the late 1940s, equity was becoming more accommodating when it 
came to the delegation of investment discretion by trustees.25  A major con-
cession was when it became generally acceptable for trustees to invest in mu-
tual funds, provided the funds were prudently selected by the trustee and the 
performance of the funds prudently monitored by the trustee.26  A trustee who 
invests in a mutual fund effectively delegates investment discretion to the 
trustees of the mutual fund.27 
By the 1970s it had become common practice for banks to perform 
agency services for individual trustees.28  When it came to investment man-
agement, however, a bank would generally want its trustee-customer to sign 
off in advance of the agent-bank making a trade.29  After all, back then such 
investment discretion was generally perceived by those of us working in the 
trust industry as possibly still being a non-delegable fiduciary function, at 
least under the default law.30  To insert an arbitration clause into the bank’s 
standard “agent-for-the-fiduciary-agreement” form would have been thought 
a bridge way too far, even tacky, and certainly not binding on the trust bene-
ficiaries who were not parties to the agency agreement and the arbitration 
contract incident to it.31  After all, both the customer, as trustee, and the bank, 
as the customer-trustee’s agent, in equity owed fiduciary duties to the bene-
ficiaries of the particular trust.32  And certainly the equity court would not 




                                                     
25. See, e.g., In re Rees’ Estate, 85 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949), aff’g 87 N.E.2d 397 
(Ohio Prob. 1947). 
26. Id. 
27. See generally 4 SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 19.1.10 (5th ed. 2017). 
28. To this day, it is the Comptroller of the Currency who is charged with overseeing national 
banks in the performance of such agency services. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1, 9.2(e) (2017).  
29. In the 1970s the go-to texts on trust law were asserting that a trustee’s authority to delegate 
investment discretion was unsettled. See, e.g., ROUNDS JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at 79 (“The 
law is by no means settled on this point although the intricacies of modern investment seem to 
demand an early answer.”). That being the case, it was felt that a bank acting as investment agent 
for an individual trustee risked liability for knowingly participating in a breach of trust were the 
bank as the trustee’s agent to execute a trade without the trustee-principal signing off in advance. 
See generally id. at § 7.2.9 (showing the liability of a third party who knowing participates in a 
breach of trust). 
30. ROUND JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at § 7.2.9. 
31. Radford, supra note 1, at 278-83.  
32. See generally ROUND JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at ch. 6 (the trustee’s equitable 
duties to the beneficiary); Id. at § 7.2.9 (personal liability of the trustee’s agents to the beneficiary). 
33. Cf. id. at § 3.5.3.3 (the court jealously guards its authority over the administration of trusts). 
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B. DELEGATION BY TRUSTEES OF INVESTMENT-MANAGEMENT 
DISCRETION: A POST-UTC/UPIA LIABILITY PRIMER 
The publication of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts’ Prudent Investor 
Rule in 1992 pretty much ended the debate as to whether equity should or 
would look askance at the delegation by trustees of investment discretion.34  
It would not and should not.  Under the default law, investment discretion 
was now a function that was properly delegable by a trustee, provided that 
the agent was prudently selected by the trustee and prudently monitored by 
the trustee.35  In 1994, the state legislatures began turning out versions of the 
UPIA, which codified the Prudent Investor Rule, including the provision of 
the Rule that endorsed the prudent delegation of investment discretion.36  In 
2000, the UTC, which tracks virtually verbatim the delegation provisions of 
the UPIA, was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws.37 
Now that investment discretion is properly delegable by trustees, pro-
vided the trustee’s investment agent is prudently selected by the trustee and 
his activities prudently monitored by the trustee, who is now primarily liable 
to the trust beneficiaries for the consequences of imprudent investing, the 
trustee-principal or the trustee’s investment agent?  The UPIA’s and UTC’s 
answer is the latter.38  Equity eventually would probably have answered the 
latter as well, the delegation of investment discretion no longer being per se 
improper.39  While the horse has now long been out of the barn, one wonders 
whether this is good public policy.  Of the three parties (the trustee-fiduciary; 
the trustee’s investment agent, who owes fiduciary duties to the trust benefi-
                                                     
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE §171 (AM. LAW INST. 
1992). 
35. See id. at §143. 
36. See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Prudent Investor Act Map, http://www.uniform-
laws.org/Act.aspx?title=Prudent%20Investor%20Act (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
37. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform 
Trust Code, http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trust_code/utc_final_rev2010.pdf (last up-
dated Jan. 15, 2013). 
38. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“A trustee who complies with 
subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for an action of the agent to whom the 
function was delegated”); see also id. at § 807(b) (“In performing a delegated function, an agent 
owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care and to comply with the terms of the delegation”); 
UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 9(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“In performing a delegated func-
tion, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care and to comply with the terms of 
the delegation.”). 
39. See SCOTT, supra note 23, at 914 (“Where the trustee himself is in no way at fault, he is 
not liable for the acts of agents employed by him in the administration of the trust; but he is liable 
if he was guilty of an improper delegation in employing the agents, as he is liable also if he did not 
use reasonable care in the selection of the agent or in supervising his conduct.”). 
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ciary; and the trust beneficiary) the only one who is truly innocent is the clue-
less, vulnerable trust beneficiary, to whom all fiduciary duties run and by 
whom no duties are owed.40  Why should the trust beneficiary and not the 
compensated trustee-fiduciary bear the primary burden of any injury to the 
trust estate that is perpetrated by, say, an impecunious defalcating investment 
agent of the trustee?  The initial delegation was a decision of the trustee, not 
the trust beneficiary, and for the convenience of the trustee, not the trust ben-
eficiary.41  In any case, what is done is done.  The provisions of the UTC and 
UPIA off-loading primary fiduciary liability from the shoulders of the trustee 
onto the shoulders of his investment agent are now statutory law in most 
states.42  As an aside, while the law makes certain allowances for the amateur 
trustee who breaches his trust,43 no such allowances are made for the amateur 
investment agent of the trustee who breaches a fiduciary duty that the amateur 
investment agent of the trustee owes the trust beneficiary.44  
If one assumes that there is no basis at law or in equity for the enforce-
ment of the arbitration clause against the trust beneficiary and that the trus-
tee’s investment agent would be advantaged in some way by its enforcement, 
then the trust beneficiaries should be entitled to an equitable rescission of the 
contract’s arbitration provisions.45  Otherwise, the trustee’s investment agent 
would be unjustly enriched by the inability of the trust beneficiaries to gain 
immediate and full access to the courts.46  The unjust-enrichment argument 
becomes more compelling if the lack of immediate and full access to the 
courts could credibly and quantifiably compromise the equitable property 
rights of the trust beneficiaries.47 
III. THE FAILURE OF THE TRUSTEE’S INVESTMENT AGENT TO 
                                                     
40. See generally ROUNDS JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at § 5.6. 
41. See Radford, supra note 1, at 283-84. 
42. See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Enactment Status Maps, http://www.uniform-
laws.org/Act.aspx?title=trust%20Code (Trust Code) and http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?ti-
tle=Prudent%20Investor%20Act (Prudent Investor Act). 
43. See generally ROUNDS JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at § 6.1.4 (discussing the amateur 
trustee); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 806 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (stating that a trustee with special 
skills has a duty to employ those skills). 
44. Neither the UTC nor the UPIA, for example, makes allowances for the amateur investment 
agent. See generally UNIF. TRUST CODE (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
45. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: UNJUST ENRICHMENT §1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1937). 
46. See ROUNDS JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at § 8.15.78.  
47. Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY § 138(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1937) (“A fiduciary who has acquired a benefit by a breach of his duty as fiduciary 
is under a duty of restitution to the beneficiary.”). 
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WAIVE HIS RIGHTS AT LAW UNDER THE ARBITRATION 
CONTRACT WOULD BE A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
THE TRUST BENEFICIARY TO THE EXTENT SUCH A WAIVER 
WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TRUST BENEFICIARY 
However, from the trust beneficiary’s perspective, it would seem a rea-
sonable corollary that if the trustee’s investment agent is now primarily liable 
in equity to the trust beneficiary for what would be a breach of trust had it 
been perpetrated by the trustee, there is no principle of contract law, trust law, 
agency law, or property law that would justify enforcing an arbitration con-
tract to which only the trustee and his agent are parties against the innocent 
and clueless trust beneficiary.48  The trustee’s investment agent is not an 
agent of the trust beneficiary.49  The trustee’s investment agent is not in a 
contractual relationship with the trust beneficiary.50  The trustee’s investment 
agent owes fiduciary duties directly to the trust beneficiary incident to the 
trust relationship.51  There is no basis at law or in equity for imposing an 
obligation to arbitrate on a non-consenting trust beneficiary.52  The trust ben-
eficiary may sue the trustee’s investment agent directly, thanks to the UTC 
and UPIA.53  The trust beneficiary’s rights are not derivative of, or incidental 
to, the agency agreement between the trustee and the trustee’s investment 
agent.54  Thus, to judicially deny the trust beneficiary immediate and full ac-
cess to the courts in derogation of his equitable property rights under the trust 
is tantamount to a partial taking of those rights by the state.55 
The UPIA and the UTC have made it settled statutory law that the trus-
tee’s investment agent ab initio directly owes the trust beneficiary fiduciary 
duties, such as the duty to refrain from unauthorized self-dealing, a duty that 
is incident to the duty of undivided loyalty.56  A failure on the part of the 
                                                     
48. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law. . . .”). 
49. See Radford, supra note 1, at 278-83. 
50. Id. 
51. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“In performing a delegated 
function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of 
the delegation.”); UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 9(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (“In performing 
a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with 
the terms of the delegation.”). 
52. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
53. Id. 
54. Radford, supra note 1, at 278-83. 
55. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
56. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 190 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1937) (“A per-
son in a fiduciary relation to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters 
within the scope of the relation.”). Section 190 itself provides that “[w]here a person in a fiduciary 
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trustee’s investment agent to waive his rights under the arbitration contract, 
assuming it would be in the interests of the trust beneficiary for the trustee’s 
investment agent to do so, could well constitute such an act of unauthorized 
self-dealing.57  After all, the trust beneficiary did not enter into the arbitration 
contract with the trustee, the trustee’s investment agent did.58  And now let’s 
consider whether the trustee himself assumes some equitable culpability for 
executing the arbitration contract in the first place, assuming doing so had 
not been, and is not now, in the interests of the trust beneficiary.  
IV. A TRUSTEE WHO ENTERS INTO AN ARBITRATION CONTRACT 
WITH AN INVESTMENT AGENT MAY BE BREACHING IN 
EQUITY CERTAIN FIDUCIARY DUTIES THE TRUSTEE OWES 
THE TRUST BENEFICIARY TO THE EXTENT THE TERMS OF 
THE CONTRACT ARE NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TRUST 
BENEFICIARY 
Let us assume that the terms of a particular arbitration contract are en-
forceable at law against the non-party trust beneficiary.  Does the trust bene-
ficiary have any equitable recourse against the trustee for harm to the trust 
beneficiary’s equitable property interests that is occasioned by the contract’s 
enforcement?  A trustee has an equitable duty to act solely in the interests of 
the trust beneficiary.59  He may not subvert the interests of the trust benefi-
ciary for personal benefit or in order to further the interests of third parties.60  
The trustee who delegates investment discretion to an external investment 
agent does so either because it is convenient to do so or because the trustee 
lacks the requisite skills to prudently invest the entrusted assets.61  Whichever 
the inducement, the delegation is not per se a subversion of the beneficiary’s 
equitable property interests.62  But if there is an arbitration contract incident 
to the investment management agency agreement between the trustee and his 
investment agent and the terms of the contract are not in the interests of the 
trust beneficiary, then the trustee has breached his duty of loyalty to the trust 
                                                     
relation to another acquires property, and the acquisition or retention of the property is in violation 
of his duty as fiduciary, he holds it upon a constructive trust for the other.” Id.  
57. See generally ROUNDS JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at § 6.1.3. 
58. Radford, supra note 1, at 278. 
59. See generally ROUNDS, JR. & ROUNDS, III, supra note 8, at §6.1.3 (stating that the trustee’s 
general duty of loyalty is to the trust beneficiaries). 
60. See generally id. (explaining that the trustee’s general equitable duty of loyalty to the trust 
beneficiary). 
61. See generally id. at 537 (explaining that a trustee with minimal investment expertise may 
have a fiduciary duty to prudently delegate investment discretion to agents). 
62. See generally ROUNDS JR. & ROUNDS III, supra note 8, at §6.1.4. 
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beneficiary by entering into it in the first place, unless he had received in 
advance the informed consent of the trust beneficiary.63  Obtaining such a 
consent may be easier said than done, particularly if the trust beneficiary is 
an unborn or unascertained contingent remainderman.64  The trustee will ei-
ther need to obtain the informed consent of the beneficiary’s court-appointed 
guardian ad litem (or the informed consent of someone authorized to virtually 
represent the trust beneficiary) to enter into the arbitration contract.65 
What if the terms of an arbitration contract are not in the interests of the 
trust beneficiary but the trustee is unable to locate an investment agent willing 
to forego the protections of an arbitration contract?  The answer is simple:  
The trustee should either resign in favor of a trustee whose investment man-
agement skills make it unnecessary to delegate out investment discretion or 
retain an investment advisor to whom investment discretion is not dele-
gated.66  
V. CONCLUSION 
An arbitration contract incident to a discretionary investment-manage-
ment agency agreement between (1) the trustee of an irrevocable trust that is 
regulated by the UTC and/or the UPIA and (2) his investment agent ought 
not to be enforceable at law against the beneficiaries of the trust, whether the 
beneficiaries are current or future, and whether their equitable property inter-
ests are vested or contingent.  The trust beneficiaries are parties neither to the 
agency agreement nor the arbitration contract that is incident to it.67  The 
fiduciary duties that the trustee’s investment agent owe the trust beneficiaries 
are imposed in equity by virtue of trust principles, not at law by virtue of the 
terms of the arbitration contract to which the beneficiaries are not a party.68  
Even if the arbitration contract is enforceable at law against the non-party 
trust beneficiaries, in equity the trustee assumes fiduciary liability to the trust 
                                                     
63. Id. 
64. Id. at §8.14. 
65. Id. (when a guardian ad litem or virtual representative is needed). 
66. Id. at §6.1.3 (the trustee’s duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries). 
67. Radford, supra note 1, at 278-83. 
68. The trustee’s investment agent owes fiduciary duties to the trust beneficiaries under long-
standing general principles of equity. See generally ROUNDS, JR. & ROUNDS, III, supra note 8, at § 
7.2.9. These equitable principles have merely been reinforced by the UTC and UPIA. See generally 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 9(b) (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1994). These duties are not “legal in nature” as the trustee’s agent and the trust 
beneficiaries are neither in a contractual relationship, nor an agency relationship. See generally 4 
SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.3.10.3 (5th ed. 2017); see also WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 3 (1964). 
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beneficiaries by having entered into it in the first place.69  This is true at least  
to the extent its terms are not in the interests of the trust beneficiaries.70  The 
trustee’s investment agent in equity assumes fiduciary liability to the trust 
beneficiaries for failing to waive his rights under the contract to the extent 
such a waiver would be in the interests of the trust beneficiaries.71  If the 
terms of an arbitration contract are not in the interests of the trust beneficiar-
ies but the trustee was unable to locate an acceptable investment agent willing 
to forego the protections of an arbitration contract, the trustee should either 
resign in favor of a trustee whose personal investing skills make it unneces-
sary for the trustee to delegate out investment discretion or retain an invest-




                                                     
69. See generally ROUNDS, JR. & ROUNDS, III, supra note 8, at § 6.1.3 (discussing the trustee’s 
duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
